It has been well established that in a bimatrix game, the rank of the matrix formed by summing the payoff (or cost) matrices of the players has an impact on the runtime of the algorithms that converge to a Nash equilibrium of the game. In this paper, we devise a fast linear time algorithm that exploits strategic equivalence between bimatrix games to identify whether or not a given bimatrix game is strategically equivalent to a zero-sum game, and if it is, then we present an algorithm that computes a strategically equivalent zero-sum game.
Introduction
The study of game theory -the model of strategic interaction between rational agents -has a rich history dating back to the initiation of the field by John von Neumann in 1928 [1] . The relatively recent rapid growth in computing power, the Internet, and game theoretical models in engineering and computer science has led to significant interest in devising fast algorithms for computation of solutions in games. Indeed, this intersection of computer science, game theory, and economic theory has led to the creation of a new field of study called Algorithmic Game Theory [2] . Computing a Nash equilibrium (NE) in a k-player finite normal-form game is one of the fundamental problems for Algorithmic Game Theory. 1 Due to the well known theorem by Nash in 1951, we know that every finite game has a solution, possibly in mixed strategies [3] . However, computation of a NE has been shown to be computationally hard. For k ≥ 3, [4, 5] proved that computing a NE is Polynomial Parity Argument, Directed Version (PPAD) complete. Indeed, even the seemingly simpler 2-player bimatrix case has been shown to be PPAD-complete [6] . For any bimatrix game, the classic Lemke-Howson algorithm [7] is guaranteed to find a NE. However, this algorithm is known to have exponential running time [8] . For surveys on computational issues of NE see [9, 10] and [2, Chapter 2] .
In this work we focus on finite, 2-player bimatrix games in which the payoffs to the players can be represented as two matrices, A and B. With the hardness of computing a NE in the bimatrix case well established, identifying classes of games whose solutions can be computed efficiently is an active area of research. As an example in bimatrix games, one can compute the solution of zero-sum games 2 in polynomial time using the minimax theorem and a simple linear program [11, p. 152] . Another subclass of games that admits a polynomial time solution is the class of strategically zero-sum games introduced by Moulin and Vial in 1978 [12] . They identify a class of games that are strategically-equivalent to some zero-sum game and therefore have exactly the same set of NE as the zero-sum game. For these games, Moulin and Vial propose a characterization that, in polynomial time, can check for the strategically zero-sum property and, if it exists, calculate the resulting zerosum game. More recently, Kontogiannis and Spirakis studied mutually concave bimatrix games and provided a polynomial time characterization based on solving a convex quadratic program. Interestingly, they also conclude that the mutually concave property is equivalent to the strategically zero-sum property.
In contrast to computing an exact solution in games, other recent work has focused on devising polynomial time algorithms for computing approximate Nash equilibria of special subclasses of bimatrix games. In [13] , the authors consider games where both payoff matrices have fixed rank k and propose a quasi-polynomial time algorithm for computing approximate Nash equilibrium. In [14] , the authors define constant rank games where rank(A + B) = k and provide a polynomial time algorithm to compute an approximate Nash equilibrium. For rank-1 games, [15] devised an algorithm that can compute the solution in polynomial time. Here we note that rank-0 games are clearly zero-sum games. With the polynomial tractability of rank-k games for k ≤ 1 established, one could hope that there exists polynomial algorithms for other low-rank games. Unfortunately, a recent result has shown that rank-k games for k ≥ 3 are PPAD-hard [16] . The case of rank-2 games is still unresolved.
Prior Work
Many papers in the literature have explored the concept of equivalent classes of games. One such concept is strategic equivalence, those games that share exactly the same set of NE. Indeed, for a classical example, von Neumann and Morgenstern studied strategically equivalent n-person zero-sum games [11, p. 245] and constant-sum games [11, p. 346] .
In a recent work by Possieri and Hespanha, the authors consider the problem of designing strategically equivalent games [17] . As such, given a bimatrix game G, their problem is to design a family of games that is either weakly strategically equivalent 3 or strongly strategically equivalent. 4 Since this work falls into the category of mechanism design, it is incompatible with the work that we present here. Indeed, we consider the inverse problemgiven a bimatrix game G, does there exist a strategically equivalent zero-sum game.
More closely related to our work is the class of strategically zero-sum games defined by Moulin and Vial in [12] . They study the class of games in which no completely mixed NE can be improved upon via a correlation strategy and come to the conclusion that these games are the class of strategically zero-sum games. For the bimatrix case, they provide a complete characterization of strategically zero-sum games [12, Theorem 2] . While the authors do not analyze the algorithmic implications of their characterization, Kontogiannis and Spirakis do analyze the approach in their work on mutually concave games. They find that the characterization in [12, Theorem 2] can determine whether a bimatrix game is strategically zero-sum, and, if so, calculate an equivalent zero-sum game in time O(m 3 n 3 ).
Around the same time, Isaacson and Millham studied a class of bimatrix games that they characterized as row-constant games [18] . They define row-constant games as those bimatrix games where the sum of the payoff matrices is a matrix with constant rows. In their work, they show that the NE strategies of a row-constant game can be found via solving the zero-sum game (m, n, A, −A). Comparing [18] and [12] , one can easily see that row-constant games form a subclass of strategically zero-sum games.
Closely related to strategically zero-sum bimatrix games are the class of strictly competitive games [19] . In a strictly competitive game, if both players change their mixed strategies, then either the payoffs remain unchanged, or one of the two payoffs increases while the other payoff decreases. In other words, all possible outcomes are Pareto optimal. It has long been claimed that strictly competitive games share many common and desirable NE features with zero-sum games, such as ordered interchangeability, NE payoff equivalence, and convexity of the NE set 5 [20] . Indeed, Aumann claims that strictly competitive games are equivalent to zero-sum games [19] . Moulin and Vial proceed to cite Aumann's claim when arguing that strictly competitive games form a subclass of strategically zero-sum games [12, Example 2] . However, many years later Adler et. al. conducted a literature search and found that the claim of equivalence of strictly competitive games and zero-sum games was often repeated, but without formal proof [21] . They then proceeded to prove that this claim does indeed hold true. Comparing the results of Adler et. al [21] to the characterization of strategically zero-sum games in [12] , one can observe that Moulin and Vial were correct in asserting that strictly competitive games form a subclass of strategically zero-sum games.
Another class of games that shares some NE properties with zero-sum games is the class of (weakly) unilaterally competitive games. As defined by Kats and Thisse in [22] , a game is unilaterally competitive if a unilateral change in strategy by one player results in a (weak) increase in that player's payoff if and only if it results in a (weak) decrease in the payoff of all other players. A game is weakly unilaterally competitive if a unilateral change in strategy by one player results in a strict increase in that player's payoff, then the payoffs of all other players (weakly) decrease. If the payoff of the player who makes the unilateral move remains unchanged, then the payoffs of all players remain unchanged. For the two-player case, strictly competitive games form a subclass of unilaterally competitive games, and unilaterally competitive games form a subclass of weakly unilaterally competitive games. For the bimatrix case, Kats and Thisse show that (weakly) unilaterally competitive games have the ordered interchangeability and NE payoff equivalence properties [22] . However, convexity of the NE set is only proved for infinite games with quasiconcave payoff functions.
Finally, in [23] , Kontogiannis and Spirakis formulate a quadratic program where the optimal solutions of the quadratic program constitute a subset of the correlated equilibria of a bimatrix game. Furthermore, they then show that this subset of correlated equilibria are exactly the NE of the game. In order to show polynomial tractability of the quadratic program, they define a class of mutually concave bimatrix games. Surprisingly, they find that their characterization of mutually concave bimatrix games is equivalent to Moulin and Vial's characterization of strategically zero-sum bimatrix games [23, Corollary 2] . While the time complexity of the original quadratic program is extremely high, Kontogiannis and Spirakis propose a parameterized version of the Mangasarian and Stone quadratic program that is guaranteed to be convex for a mutually concave game and has time complexity O(n 3.5 ) for 2 ≤ m ≤ n [23, Theorem 2] . With the problem of solving a mutually concave game shown to be tractable, the authors then proceed to show that recognizing a mutually concave game can be done in time O(m 2 n).
Our Contribution
Given a nonzero-sum bimatrix game, (m, n,Ã,B) ∈ Q m×n × Q m×n , we develop the SER0 algorithm that, in time linear in the size of the game, determines whether or not the given game is strategically equivalent to some zero-sum game (m, n, A, −A). If so, our approach also finds an equivalent zero-sum game in time O(mn). This equivalent zero-sum game can then be solved with one call to a linear program solver. Since the two games are strategically equivalent, the NE strategies of the equivalent zero-sum game are exactly the NE strategies of the original nonzero-sum bimatrix game (m, n,Ã,B).
Most of the prior work on subclasses of bimatrix games focuses on characterizing those games and proving some properties of the NE of the game [12, 18, 19, 21, 22] . However, other than [23] , these works do not discuss tractable methods for identifying whether a game is in a particular subclass. Of course, identifying whether a game is row-constant is rather trivial. However, that isn't true for many of the other classes discussed in Subsection 1.1. In contrast, we focus here on efficient methods for identifying strategically equivalent rank-0 games. In addition, as we show in Section 5, our algorithm also efficiently identifies strictly competitive games.
In comparison to prior work on strategically zero-sum games [12] , the SER0 algorithm identifies whether or not a game is strategically zero-sum in time O(mn) versus O(m 3 n 3 ), which is a significant improvement. Compared to identifying mutually concave games [23] , the SER0 algorithm is also significantly faster, providing a speedup of O(m). In addition, the algorithm for mutually concave games in [23] does not find an equivalent zero-sum game. Instead, they find a parameter that insures mutual concavity and find a NE of the original game by solving a convex quadratic program. In contrast, the SER0 algorithm returns, in linear time, an equivalent zero-sum game that can be solved via linear programming.
Outline of the Paper
We begin by defining the notation used throughout the paper and recalling some gametheoretic definitions. Then, in Section 3 we formulate the problem and informally present the results. We defer formal statements and proofs of our results to the appendices. We first show that if there exists γ > 0 and D ∈ M m×n (R) (we precisely define M m×n (R) later) such thatB + γÃ = D, then the nonzero-sum game (m, n,Ã,B) is strategically equivalent to the zero-sum game (m, n, A, −A). Following that, we present an efficient method for computing γ and present a decomposition of the matrix D in Theorem 14 based on the Wedderburn Rank Reduction Formula, which is a classical result in linear algebra. While the Wedderburn Rank Reduction Formula provides the analytical result that we desire, the complexity of directly implementing the algorithm can be high. Therefore, in Appendix C we show an efficient technique for implementing the technique for a matrix D ∈ M m×n (R).
While the results in in Section 3 apply in general to real bimatrix games with (m, n,Ã,B) ∈ R m×n × R m×n , for the purposes of algorithmic analysis in Section 4 we constrain the problem to rational bimatrix games with (m, n,Ã,B) ∈ Q m×n × Q m×n . In Section 4, we provide an algorithmic analysis of a shortened version of the SER0 algorithm while presenting an in-depth discussion in Appendix D.
We then present some additional discussion on the convexity of the set of NE in a strategically zero-sum game and numerical results.
Notation
We use 1 n and 0 n to denote, respectively, the all ones and all zeros vectors of length n. All vectors are annotated by bold font, e.g u, and all vectors are treated as column vectors. ∆ n is the set of probability distributions over {1, . . . , n}, where
Let e j , j ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}, denote the vector with 1 in the j th position and 0's elsewhere.
Consider a matrix C. We use rank(C) to indicate the rank of the matrix C. ColSpan(C) indicates the subspace spanned by the columns of the matrix C, also known as the column space of the matrix C. We indicate the nullspace of the matrix C, the space containing all solutions to Cx = 0 m , as null(C). In addition, we use C (j) to denote the j th column of C and C (i) to denote the i th row of C.
Preliminaries
In this section, we recall some basic definitions in bimatrix games and the definition of strategic equivalence in bimatrix games.
We consider here a two player game, in which player 1 (the row player) has m actions and player 2 (the column player) has n actions. Player 1's set of pure strategies is denoted by S 1 = {1, . . . , m} and player 2's set of pure strategies is S 2 = {1, . . . , n}. If the players play pure strategies (i, j) ∈ S 1 × S 2 , then player 1 receives a payoff of a ij and player 2 receives b ij .
We let A = [a ij ] ∈ R m×n represent the payoff matrix of player 1 and B = [b ij ] ∈ R m×n represent the payoff matrix of player 2. As the two-player finite game can be represented by two matrices, this game is commonly referred to as a bimatrix game. The bimatrix game is then defined by the tuple (m, n, A, B). Define the m × n matrix C as the sum of the two payoff matrices, C := A + B. We define the rank of a game as rank(C). 6 Players may also play mixed strategies, which correspond to a probability distribution over the available set of pure strategies. Player 1 has mixed strategies p and player 2 has mixed strategies q, where p ∈ ∆ m and q ∈ ∆ n . Using the notation introduced above, player 1 has expected payoff p T Aq and player 2 has expected payoff p T Bq.
Strategic Equivalence in Bimatrix Games
A Nash Equilibrium is defined as a tuple of strategies (p * , q * ) such that each player's strategy is an optimal response to the other player's strategy. In other words, neither player can benefit, in expectation, by unilaterally deviating from the Nash Equilibrium. This is made precise in the following definition.
Definition 1 (Nash Equilibrium [3] ). We refer to the pair of strategies (p * , q * ) as a Nash Equilibrium (NE) if and only if:
It is a well known fact due to Nash [3] that every bimatrix game with a finite set of pure strategies has at least one NE in mixed strategies. However, one can define games in which multiple NE exist in mixed strategies. Let Φ : R m×n × R m×n ⇒ ∆ m × ∆ n be the Nash equilibrium correspondence 7 : Given the matrices (A, B), Φ(A, B) ⊂ ∆ m × ∆ n denotes the set of all Nash equilibria of the game (m, n, A, B). Note that due to the result in [3] , Φ(A, B) is nonempty for every (A, B) ∈ R m×n × R m×n .
We say that two games are strategically equivalent if both games have the same set of players, the same set of strategies per player, and the same set of Nash equilibria. The following definition formalizes this concept. We now have a well known Lemma on strategic equivalence in bimatrix games that is typically stated without proof (e.g [12, 23] ). As we were unable to find a proof in the literature, we state the relatively simple proof here.
where β 1 , β 2 ∈ R, α 1 , α 2 ∈ R >0 , u ∈ R n , and v ∈ R m . Then the game (m, n, A, B) is strategically equivalent to (m, n,Ã,B).
Proof. Since p ∈ ∆ m and q ∈ ∆ m , we have p T 1 m = 1 and
Now, assume that (p * , q * ) is an NE of (m, n,Ã,B). Then, for player 1,
7 A correspondence is a set valued map [24, p. 555] .
Similarly, for player 2,
Then Definition 2 is satisfied, and (p * , q * ) is an NE of (m, n, A, B) if and only if (p * , q * ) is an NE of (m, n,Ã,B).
Problem Formulation and Main Results
In this section we show a technique for identifying and solving games that are strategically equivalent to a zero-sum game. This technique is closely related to the strategically zero-sum games in [12] and the mutually concave games in [23] .
We begin by assuming that given a nonzero-sum game (m, n,Ã,B), there exists a positive affine transformation such that (m, n,Ã,B) is strategically equivalent to the zero-sum game (m, n, A, −A). We later show the necessary and sufficient conditions under which this assumption holds true.
From Lemma 1, we conclude that if there exists
then (m, n,Ã,B) is strategically equivalent to (m, n, A, −A). Throughout the remainder of this work we refer to this notion of strategic equivalence as a positive affine transformation (PAT). If α 1 = α 2 , we call it a uniform positive affine transformation (UPAT).
Combining (1) and (2), we have:
Defining γ :=
and D := γβ 1 1 m u T + β 2 v1 T n , we rewrite (3) as:
Clearly, the matrix D above has maximum rank(D) = 2. However, the existence of γ ∈ R >0 and D, with rank(D) ≤ 2 is not sufficient to ensure strategic equivalence. Indeed, from (4) one can see that we are searching for a matrix D ∈ M m×n (R), which we define as
Thus, what we have shown above if the following result:
Proof. The proof follows from the preceding discussions.
In what follows, we show the converse holds, and further, we devise efficient algorithms to compute γ and determine if D lies in the subspace M m×n (R). In fact, the properties of the subspace M m×n (R) play a critical role in both the analytical and algorithmic results of our work. However, we collect these properties in Appendix A.2 in order to not detract from the main results.
Assumption 3. The game (m, n,Ã,B) satisfies
Then, γ > 0.
3. The matrix D, defined as D :=B + γÃ, lies in the subspace M m×n .
Theorem 4. If Assumption 3 holds, then there exists a matrixÂ ∈ R m×n such that the bimatrix game (m, n,Ã,B) is strategically equivalent to the zero-sum game (m, n,Â, −Â).
Proof. This result is a direct consequence of Theorem 14 and Theorem 15 proved in Appendix B.1.
Thus, our algorithm indeed ascertains whether or not a given game is strategically equivalent to a zero sum game. Further, as we show in the next section, our algorithm runs in time that is linear in the size of the game to computeÂ. This also leads to some important implications about convexity of the set of Nash equilibria as discussed in Section 5.
In contrast to related works in [12] , [23] , which attempt to solve an equation (or system of equations) similar to (4) we show that it is possible to decompose the problem into a sequence of steps that allows us to reduce the overall complexity of the problem. In brief, given a game (m, n,Ã,B) these steps are Throughout the remainder of this section, we introduce the key results used in the steps above informally and implement these steps on a simple example of rock-paper-scissors game. For ease of exposition, we defer full proofs and other technical matter to the appendices.
Solving for γ
Our next result shows a computationally tractable method for solving for the parameter γ.
Informal Statement of Proposition
We present the full statement and formal proof of Proposition 13 in Section B. For the intuition behind the proof, we note that for all D ∈ M m×n (R), and for all (w, z) such that 1 T m w = 0, 1 T n z = 0, we have that w T Dz = 0. Then (5) follows directly from (4).
Determining if a Matrix is in M m×n (R)
Another crucial step in our approach is to determine whether the matricesÃ,B, D are in M m×n (R). We present here an informal method for determining this, while leaving the full statement of the relevant propositions to Appendix C.
Then, F =F iff F ∈ M m×n (R).
We present a short outline of the proof here. First-off, we haveF ∈ M m×n (R). Secondly, if F ∈ M m×n (R), thenF represents a valid decomposition of F as
So, if F ∈ M m×n (R),F is a valid decomposition, and F =F .
A Decomposition of D
We now informally state our first main result on calculating the equivalent zero-sum game (m, n,Â,B).
Informal Statement of Theorem (14) . Suppose that (m, n,Ã,B) is strategically equivalent to a zero-sum game (m, n, A, −A) through a PAT withÃ,B / ∈ M m×n (R). Define D by (4) and assume rank(D) = 2. Select any
n . Then,Â = −B and the bimatrix game (m, n,Ã,B) is strategically equivalent to the zero-sum game (m, n,Â,B).
The full statement and formal proof of Theorem 14 is given in Appendix B.1. Then Corollary 17.1 in Appendix C connects Theorem 14 to the computationally efficient decomposition of D presented above.
For an informal argument to support the claim above, we have that for any D ∈ M m×n (R) with rank(D) = 2 we can write
Then (m, n,Ã,B) is strategically equivalent to (m, n,Â,B) by Lemma 1 and
While the procedure presented above applies to rank(D) = 2, for completeness one still needs to consider the cases of rank(D) < 2. These cases are straightforward and are presented in Theorem 15 in Appendix B.2.
A Simple Example: Rock-Paper-Scissors
Consider the game matrix given in Figure 1a and let us represent this game as (m, n, A, −A). This is the classic Rock-Paper-Scissors with well known NE strategies p * = q * = [
The game in Figure 1b is a positive affine transformation of (m, n, A, −A). Let us represent this game as (m, n,Ã,B). Clearly, (m, n,Ã,B) is neither zero-sum nor constant-sum. However, by applying the process outlined above one can obtain the game in Figure 1c , which is a zero-sum game and strategically equivalent to (m, n,Ã,B). (5) we have that
Then we apply Theorem 14 with (i, j) = (1, 1) to obtain the strategically zero-sum game:
The result of these calculations is the zero-sum game (m, n,Â,B) which is displayed in Figure 1c and, as expected, has the NE strategies p * = q * = [ 
Algorithm for Strategically Equivalent Rank-0 Games (SER0)
We have shown that given the game (m, n,Ã,B), one can determine if the game is strategically equivalent to the game (m, n, A, −A) through a PAT. If so, then it is possible to construct a rank-0 game which is strategically equivalent to the original game. One can then efficiently solve the strategically equivalent zero-sum game via linear programming. We state the key steps in our algorithm below and show that both the determination of strategic equivalence and the computation of the strategically equivalent zero-sum game can be done in time O(mn).
The analytical results and discussions throughout this paper apply to real bimatrix games, with (m, n,Ã,B) ∈ R m×n × R m×n . However, for computational reasons, when discussing the algorithmic implementations we focus on rational bimatrix games, with (m, n,Ã,B) ∈ Q m×n × Q m×n .
We present here a shortened version of the SER0 algorithm that applies when rank(D) = 2. The cases of rank(D) < 2 are similar, but add complexity to the presentation. As such, the full algorithms and more detailed analysis are deferred to Appendix D.
Informal Statement of Theorem (19) . The SER0 algorithm determines if a game (m, n,Ã,B) is strategically equivalent to a rank-0 game and returns the strategically equivalent zero-sum game in time O(mn).
Here we give the analysis of ShortSER0 presented in Algorithm 1. First-off, testing whether a matrix is in M m×n (Q) is equivalent to implementing (6) and then comparing two matrices. Both these operations take time O(mn). Next, for any matrix F ∈ Q m×n calculating w T F z takes time O(m 2 ) + O(n) < O(mn) for m ≤ n. So, calculating γ can be done in time O(mn) if one has candidate vectors (w, z). Corollary 17.2 in Appendix C gives an algorithm for determining such (w, z) that runs in time O(mn).
Forming the D matrix takes mn multiplications and mn additions, and therefore has time O(mn). Finally, calculatingÂ,B for the case rank(D) = 2 consists of scalar-matrix multiplication, vector outer product, and matrix subtraction. Therefore, it has time O(mn).
This shows that overall the algorithm can both identify whether a game is strategically equivalent to a zero-sum game through a PAT and, if so, can determine the equivalent game in time O(mn). ifÃ and/orB ∈ M m×n (Q) then
3:
Calculate pure strategy NE and exit 
Solve (m, n,Â,B) via LP 
Further Discussions
Typically, a general bimatrix game may admit a set of multiple Nash equilibria that are disconnected. However, one of the well-known results in game theory is that the set of NE of a zero-sum game is a convex set in ∆ m × ∆ n . As a result, we immediately have the following result. For another example, typically fictitious play is not guaranteed to converge in nonzerosum games with n, m > 2. However, it is well known that fictitious play converges in zero-sum games [25] . Therefore, we have: As a third immediate result, consider the class of strictly competitive games, which are a subclass of strategically zero-sum games. As characterized in [21] , a game (m, n,Ã,B) is strictly competitive iff for some α > 0 and β ∈ R,B = −αA + β1 m 1 T n . Then, the following result directly follows from Theorems 15 and 19. 
Numerical Results
To evaluate the performance of the SER0 algorithm we ran several sets of experiments. For each experiment, we generated square games of size m = n, with n ∈ [500, 10000] and uniformly distributed payoff values in the game matrices. For each value of n, we ran SER0 on 10 different game instances.
All experiments were conducted on a standard desktop computer running Windows 7 with 16GB of RAM and an Intel Xeon E5-1603 processor with 4 cores running at 2.8GHz. For our first set of experiments, for each value of n we created instances (m, n,Ã,B) that Strat Eq Not Strat Eq Pure Strat Figure 2 : Average running time and standard deviation of the SER0 algorithm for strategically equivalent games, games that are not strategically equivalent, and games that are guaranteed to have at least one pure strategy NE. For each value of mn, we ran the algorithm on 10 such games.
were strategically equivalent to a zero-sum game (m, n, A, −A). In all cases tested, the SER0 algorithm correctly identified the games as strategically zero-sum and calculated the equivalent game (m, n,Â,B). As expected, one can observe from Figure 2 that for this set of experiments there is a clear linear relationship between the runtime of SER0 and the size of the game instance. In addition, for very large games of size (10000 × 10000) SER0 found the equivalent game in an average time of 3.6 seconds. For the next set of experiments we created games which were guaranteed to have a pure strategy NE. In other words, at least one ofÃ orB were in M m×n (Q). Again, the SER0 algorithm correctly identified all of these cases as having a pure strategy NE. Similar to the first set of experiments, we observe that SER0's runtime is linear in this case. As expected, this case is much faster than the strategically equivalent case as there is no need to calculatê A,B, D nor test for D ∈ M m×n (Q).
Finally, we conducted experiments on games that were not strategically equivalent to a zero-sum game via a PAT. Similar to the other two sets of experiments, the SER0 algorithm correctly identified these games as not strategically equivalent to a zero-sum game. As Figure 2 shows, this case also exhibits a linear relationship between runtime and the game size, although with a much higher standard deviation compared to the other two sets of experiments. This higher standard deviation is readily explainable by examining the SER0 algorithm. When testing whether or not a game is strategically equivalent, the test can return a negative result if either γ ≤ 0 or D / ∈ M m×n (Q). For cases of γ ≤ 0, the algorithm terminates and returns a negative result in much less time than it takes to calculate the D matrix and test for D ∈ M m×n (Q).
Conclusion
In this work we've presented an algorithm, the SER0 algorithm, that for a bimatrix game determines in linear time whether the game either has a guaranteed pure strategy Nash equilibrium or is strategically equivalent to some zero-sum game. In the latter case, the algorithm also finds the strategically equivalent zero-sum game in linear time. This strategically equivalent game can then be solved efficiently via linear programming, and this solution provides a NE strategy of the original game. This represents a significant computational advantage compared to prior work on computing strategically equivalent zero-sum games. In comparison to mutually concave games, the SER0 algorithm recognizes an equivalent game in a computationally efficient manner, then can solve the game with a linear program instead of a convex quadratic program. Thus, our algorithm substantially expands the class of nonzero-sum games for which a computationally efficient (polynomial time) algorithm for computing Nash equilibrium is known.
One interesting direction for future research would be to explore the relationship, if there is one, between (weakly) unilaterally competitive games and strategically zero-sum games. In regards to algorithmic game theory, one main challenge to address is whether or not there exists a polynomial time algorithm that could identify strategically equivalent rank-k games. Another interesting extension would be to develop an algorithm to compute approximate NE based on "almost" strategically zero-sum games.
A Results From Linear Algebra
In this section, we collect some preliminary results from linear algebra that are used throughout the rest of the paper to prove the main result. The first subsection describes the Wedderburn rank reduction formula, which presents a method to reduce the rank of a matrix through a simple decomposition technique. The second subsection discusses certain properties of the vector space M m×n that are used later in the proofs.
A.1 Wedderburn Rank Reduction Formula
Theorem 5 ([26, p. 69] [27] ). Let C ∈ R m×n be an arbitrary matrix, not identically zero. Then, there exists vectors x 1 ∈ R n and y 1 ∈ R m such that w 1 = y T 1 Cx 1 = 0. Then, setting C = C 1 for convenience, the matrix
has rank exactly one less than the rank of C.
Proof. The original proof of (7) is due to Wedderburn [26, p. 69]. We restate it here for completeness. We first show that the null space of C 2 contains the null space of C 1 . Pick z such that
Thus, z is in the null space of C 2 , which implies that the null space of C 2 contains the null space of C 1 .
Next, we show that x 1 is in the null space of C 2 , thereby showing that the dimension of the null space of C 2 is one more than the dimension of the null space of C 1 (since
Thus, the rank of C 2 is one less than the rank of C 1 .
We now have the following theorem that applies Wedderburn rank reduction formula to compute a decomposition of the matrix.
Theorem 6 (Rank-Reducing Process [26, p. 69] [27] ). Let C ∈ R m×n . If rank(C) = γ, then there exists x k ∈ R n , y k ∈ R m , k = 1, . . . , γ such that w k = y T k C k x k = 0 and the following holds:
where C 1 = C, C γ+1 = 0, and rank(C k+1 ) = rank(C k ) − 1. In addition, let
Proof. Apply Theorem 5 to C for γ + 1 iterations.
A.2 The Subspace M m×n (R)
In this subsection, we recall an essential fact from linear algebra, state an interesting corollary of Theorem 6, and introduce the the subspace M m×n (R), which we define as
The properties of this subspace are essential to formulating the algorithmic solution to our problem as the matrix D that we are searching for must lie in this subspace. Let us begin by stating an essential fact on the rank-1 decomposition of a matrix. Corollary 6.1. For a matrix M ∈ R m×n with rank(M ) = r, let {W k } for k ∈ {1, . . . , r} be a set of rank-1 matrices derived from the rank-reducing process in Theorem 6. Let M 1 = M , and M k+1 be as defined in (8) .
Proof. By recursively applying (8) from Theorem 6, we can write M k+1 as
Then, combined with (9) we have
From (10) We now proceed to prove that M m×n (R) is indeed a subspace of the vector space of all real matrices. Following that, we state some essential properties of the subspace that will be used throughout the presentation in Appendix B.
Lemma 7. Let V m×n (R) be the vector space of real m × n matrices and M m×n (R) be the space of real matrices such that for all M ∈ M m×n (R),
Proof. We show that M m×n (R) meets the three properties of a subspace of a vector space. First, consider u = 0 n ,v = 0 m . Then, M = 0 m×n and the zero vector is in M m×n (R). Secondly, for all M 1 , M 2 ∈ M m×n (R),
Lemma 8. For any matrix M ∈ R m×n with M = 0 m×n there is at least one nonzero column and one nonzero row. Let M (j) and M (i) denote such a column and row. Then, with x = e j and y = e i we have that
Proof. The proof is straightforward and therefore omitted.
Lemma 9. For any matrix M ∈ M m×n (R):
Proof. For claim 1, 1 m ∈ ColSpan(M ) and 1 n ∈ ColSpan(M T ) follows directly from rank(M ) = 2 and Fact 1. In addition, M ∈ M m×n (R) and rank(M ) = 2 implies that there exists v = 0 n and u = 0 m such that M = 1 m u T + v1 T n . Also from Fact 1 and rank(M ) = 2, we have that for all a ∈ R, v = a1 m since v and 1 m must be linearly independent. Then, for all x such that M x = 1 m we have that:
v = a1 m implies that the equation above is satisfied if and only if 1 T n x = 0 and u T x = 1. To prove that for all y such that M T y = 1 n , 1 T m y = 0 apply the same technique to M T . Claim 2 follows directly from rank(M ) = 1 and Fact 1.
In the next lemma, we show that if there is a row and a column of a matrix in the subspace M m×n (R) with all zero entries, then the matrix itself is a zero matrix. This result is used later to devise an efficient algorithm to check whether or not a matrix lies in the space M m×n (R).
Lemma 10. For any matrix F ∈ R m×n , if there exists i, j such that F (i) = 0 T n and F (j) = 0 m then F ∈ M m×n (R) if and only if F = 0 m×n .
Proof. Clearly F = 0 m×n implies that F ∈ M m×n (R) and that for all i, j F (i) = 0 T n and F (j) = 0 m . Now, consider the forward direction and suppose that F ∈ M m×n (R). Then from the definition of M m×n (R), we have that rank(F ) ≤ 2. We will show that rank(F ) = 0.
. Then, by Lemma 9 rank(F ) = 1, 2. Therefore, rank(F ) = 0 and F = 0 m×n .
For a matrix A ∈ R m×n , let us define the set WZ(A) as
Proof. We show the proof by constructing appropriate vectors z and w such that w T Az = 0. First-off, we note that for any
We first consider the case where A has a decomposition such that, for some M ∈ M m×n (R), v 1 ∈ R n , and u 1 ∈ R m , we can write
with u 1 = 0 m and v 1 = 0 n . We then extend the proof to the more general case. Constructing the orthogonal projection of u 1 onto 1 m and v 1 onto 1 n we let
Then, as desired, we have that
In addition, since v 1 is not a scalar multiple of 1 m and u 1 is not a scalar multiple of 1 n , we use Cauchy-Schwarz inequality to get (both the inequalities are strictly positive)
Then,
We now proceed to the more general case. For any A ∈ R m×n , A / ∈ M m×n (R) and
Proof.Ã / ∈ M m×n (R) and Lemma 11 implies that WZ(Ã) is nonempty and (13) holds. We now claim that (15) holds. Indeed, we have
Since α 1 is positive, we conclude that (15) holds and WZ(Ã) = WZ(A).
Then by (15) , α 2 > 0, and
we conclude that (14) holds and WZ(B) = WZ(A). Finally, from (17), (18), and (15) we have that
which establishes the identity in (16) .
Thus, what we have shown above is that given a nonzero-sum bimatrix game that we know is strategically equivalent to a zero-sum bimatrix game, we can easily ascertain that γ is strictly greater than 0 by picking any (w, z) ∈ WZ(Ã). In the sequel, our results bank on this observation, wherein we assume the existence of γ > 0 such thatB + γÃ ∈ M m×n (R) and proceed to identify a strategically equivalent zero-sum game. For ease of exposition, we break the result into two theorems-Theorem 14 and Theorem 15-proved in the next two subsections.
B.1 The case of rank(D) equals 2
Theorem 14. Consider the game (m, n,Ã,B), and assume thatÃ,B / ∈ M m×n (R). If there exists γ ∈ R >0 such thatB + γÃ = D ∈ M m×n (R) with rank(D) = 2, then there exists x 1 ∈ R n and y 1 ∈ R m such that Dx 1 = 1 m and w 1 = y T 1 Dx 1 = 0. Letû
1 y T 1 D and compute D 2 using (7) as follows:
Then,Â = −B and the bimatrix game (m, n,Ã,B) is strategically equivalent to the zero-sum game (m, n,Â,B).
Proof. Lemma 9, D ∈ M m×n (R), and rank(D) = 2 implies that 1 m ∈ ColSpan(D), 1 n ∈ ColSpan(D T ). Therefore, there exists x 1 such that Dx 1 = 1 m . Lemma 8 implies that there exists y 1 ∈ R m such that y T 1 D = 0 n and 1 T m y 1 = 0. Therefore, we have
After applying the Wedderburn rank reduction formula, we have
We now proceed to show that D 2 =v1 T n for some vectorv. We have that D ∈ M m×n (R) and 1 mû T ∈ M m×n (R). Then, by Lemma 7, D 2 ∈ M m×n (R). In addition, by Theorem 5, rank(D 2 ) = 1. By Corollary 6.1, we have that 1 m / ∈ ColSpan(D 2 ). Then Lemma 9,
Finally, withÂ = γÃ − 1 mû T andB =B − D 2 we havê We note here that cases 2 and 3 above subsume the more commonly studied constantsum game.
Theorems 14 and 15 only apply to determining strategic equivalence whenÃ,B / ∈ M m×n (R). That leaves open the question of strategic equivalence when either game matrix lies in M m×n (R). The following proposition shows that, regardless of strategic equivalence, a pure strategy NE is guaranteed to exist if either payoff matrix in the game lies in M m×n (R). It is then trivial to calculate such a pure strategy NE. We note here that, although arrived at in a different manner, our Proposition 16 is equivalent to [23, Proposition 7] forÃ,B ∈ M m×n (R). However, the further assertion that the proposition holds for eitherÃ ∈ M m×n (R) orB ∈ M m×n (R) is not made by the authors of [23] .
B.3 Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium
Proposition 16. IfÃ ∈ M m×n (R) and/orB ∈ M m×n (R) then the game (m, n,Ã,B) has a pure strategy equilibrium.
Proof. We first consider the case ofÃ,B ∈ M m×n (R). For allÃ,B ∈ M m×n (R), we can writeÃ andB as:Ã
Then, writingÃ = V + 1 m u T 1 andB = U + v 2 1 T n it is clear by Lemma 1 that the game (m, n,Ã,B) is strategically equivalent to the game (m, n, V, U ). The game (m, n, V, U ) has a trivial pure strategy NE where player 1 plays i ∈ argmax i∈S 1 v 1 and player 2 plays j ∈ argmax j∈S 2 u 2 .
We now consider the case ofÃ ∈ M m×n (R),B / ∈ M m×n (R). Using the same argument as above, the game (m, n,Ã,B) is strategically equivalent to the game (m, n, V,B). The game (m, n, V,B) has a pure strategy equilibrium, wherein player 1 plays i ∈ argmax i∈S 1 v 1 and player 2 plays j ∈ argmax j∈S 2B i .
The procedure for deriving an equivalent zero-sum game in Theorem 14 requires us to check that certain matrix D :=B + γÃ lies in the subspace M m×n (R). We devise an efficient algorithm to do this in the next section.
C Checking if a Matrix is in M m×n (R)
In this appendix, we discuss efficient methods for determining if a matrix F is in M m×n (R), an efficient method for implementing Theorem 14, and for F / ∈ M m×n (R) a procedure for finding a (w, z) ∈ WZ(F ).
The application of the Wedderburn rank reduction formula in Theorem 14 is relatively efficient, other than solving for Dx 1 = 1 m . In the discussion that follows, we will show that:
1. There is no need to explicitly solve Dx 1 = 1 m .
2. The matrices D 2 and 1 mû T can be calculated through only matrix addition/subtraction.
3. Theorem 14 also provides an efficient method for determining whether or not any matrix F is in M m×n (R).
First-off, suppose that D ∈ M m×n (R) and rank(D) = 2. Therefore, we know that there exists a vector x 1 such that Dx 1 = 1 m . Examining Theorem 14, we see that the term x 1 always appears as a term in the matrix-vector product Dx 1 . Therefore, we can replace all appearances of the term Dx 1 with 1 m and there is no need to explicitly calculate x 1 .
One feasible, but naive, way to select y 1 is to simply choose a random vector in R m such that 1 T m y 1 = 0. A more algorithmic efficient manner is to let y 1 = e i for some i. Then we have that:
w
Then, we also have:
. . .
In other words, we can form 1 mû T directly by replicating any nonzero row of D. Now, we note that for D 2 we have that:
From the equation above, it appears that one requires the entire D matrix in order to form
Here, we show that it is possible to construct D 2 using just one column of D. Consider
Comparing the vector expression for (20) to the matrix form of D 2 in (19), it is clear that for any chosen i ∈ {1 . . . m} and for all j ∈ {1 . . . n}, we have D
In other words, pick a column j of D, subtract d i,j from every element in the column, then replicate the resulting vector n times to form D 2 . Therefore, the matrices D 2 and 1 mû T can be calculated through only matrix addition and subtraction.
In the previous discussion, we assumed that D ∈ M m×n (R) and rank(D) = 2. In the next proposition, we show that using a similar process as above it is possible to determine if any matrix F ∈ R m×n is in M m×n (R).
Theorem 17. Given a matrix F ∈ R m×n , select any row i of F and any column j of F and construct the matrices:
and letF
Then F is in M m×n (R) if and only ifF = 0 m×n .
Proof. First, we note that R = 1 m F (i) ∈ M m×n (R) and C = (F (j) −1 m f i,j )1 T n ∈ M m×n (R). Then by Lemma 7 and (21) we have F ∈ M m×n (R) if and only ifF ∈ M m×n (R). We will show thatF is in M m×n (R) if and only ifF = 0 m×n . We have that:
In this form, it is clear thatF
if and only ifF = 0 m×n . Now, combining Theorem 17 above and the discussion at the beginning of the section, the next corollary shows that it is possible to use the same algorithm for both testing whether D ∈ M m×n (R) and to perform one step of the Wedderburn rank-reducing process. Effectively, this corollary shows that it is possible to implement Theorem 14 in an efficient manner.
Corollary 17.1. Given matrix D ∈ R m×n select any row i of D and any column j of D and construct the matrices:Ŵ
Proof. The corollary follows directly from Theorem 17 and the fact thatŴ ,D 2 were constructed in accordance with Theorem 14.
We now turn our attention to an efficient manner to calculate z ∈ z ∈ R n | 1 T n z = 0 and w ∈ w ∈ R m | 1 T m w = 0 in order to compute a candidate parameter γ as per Proposition 13. The proof of Lemma 11 gives one possible construction of such a z and w.
However, that construction is too computationally intensive for our application here. In contrast, the next corollary shows a computationally efficient manner for computing z and w for F / ∈ M m×n (R).
Corollary 17.2. Given matrix F ∈ R m×n constructF as in Theorem 17. IfF = 0 m×n , choose any (l, k) such thatf l,k = 0, let w = e l − e i , and z = e k − e j . Then z ∈ z ∈ R n | 1 T n z = 0 , w ∈ w ∈ R m | 1 T m w = 0 , and
Proof. Clearly w and z are constructed such that z ∈ z ∈ R n | 1 T n z = 0 , w ∈ w ∈ R m | 1 T m w = 0 . From Theorem 17 we have that:
Then we have:
SinceF was constructed such thatF (i) = 0 T n andF (j) = 0 m , we have that: Finally,f l,k was selected such thatf l,k = 0. This completes the proof.
We now study the time complexity of SER0 algorithm in the next section.
D Time Complexity of the SER0 algorithm
We have shown that given the game (m, n,Ã,B), one can determine if the game is strategically equivalent to the game (m, n, A, −A) through a PAT. If so, then it is possible to construct a rank-0 game which is strategically equivalent to the original game. One can then efficiently solve the strategically equivalent zero-sum game via linear programming. We state the key steps in our algorithm below and show that both the determination of strategic equivalence and the computation of the strategically equivalent zero-sum game can be computed in time O(mn).
The results and discussions in the previous sections of this paper apply to real bimatrix games, with (m, n,Ã,B) ∈ R m×n × R m×n . However, for computational reasons we now focus on rational bimatrix games, with (m, n,Ã,B) ∈ Q m×n × Q m×n .
The most computationally extensive portion of our algorithm is the function for determining whether a given matrix F is in M m×n (Q). Therefore, we will first focus on describing that algorithm and analyzing its computational complexity.
The function IsMatrixInM in Algorithm 2 takes as input a matrix F ∈ Q m×n and an option∈ {1, 2}. For both options, it returns whether or not F is in M m×n (Q). If option= 1, then it is an implementation of Corollary 17.2 and also returns (α, l, k) where (l, k) is the index of the first nonzero element found inF and α =f l,k . We note here that if F ∈ M m×n (Q) then (α, l, k) = (0, m, n).
If option= 2, IsMatrixInM is an implementation of Corollary 17.1. As such, if F ∈ M m×n (Q) it also returns (R, C) = (W, D 2 ).
The algorithm first identifies a nonzero row and column of the input matrix F . It then proceeds to formulate the R, C andF matrices as described in Theorem 17. Finally, it searches overF for the first nonzero element. If a nonzero element is found, it marks the matrix as not in M m×n (Q) and sets α equal to that element. If no nonzero element is found, then it marks the matrix as in M m×n (Q). Finally, the proper variables are returned based on the option selected.
Proposition 18. The IsMatrixInM algorithm terminates in time O(mn).
Proof. Forming the R matrix requires m iterations of copying a vector of length n, for time O(mn). Similarly, forming the C matrix requires n iterations with one subtraction of a vector of length m and one assignment of an n length vector per iteration, for a total time of O(mn). Finally, the nested for loops in lines 11 to 22 search an m × n matrix for the first nonzero element, with a worst case running time of O(mn) ifF = 0 m×n . Therefore, the overall running time of the algorithm is O(mn).
We now turn our attention to describing and analyzing the StratZeroSum function from Algorithm 3. The StratZeroSum function accepts as input two game matrices (Ã,B) ∈ Q m×n × Q m×n . It returns whether or not the game is guaranteed to have a pure strategy NE, whether or not the game is strategically equivalent to a nonzero-sum game, and the equivalent game matrices.
The function first checks whether (Ã,B) ∈ M m×n (Q). If either is true, it marks that the game always has a pure strategy and returns the original game matrices. Otherwise, it compares the indices returned by IsMatrixInM. If those indices don't match, then the conditions for Proposition 13 are not met, we mark that the game is not strategically equivalent to a nonzero-sum game and the algorithm terminates. Here we note that since IsMatrixInM returns the first nonzero element encountered, testing for equality in the indices is equivalent to testing wBz = 0 for w = e l 1 − e i 1 , z = e k 1 − e j 1 .
Otherwise, we test for γ ≤ 0. If γ ≤ 0 then the conditions for Theorem 14 are not met, we mark that the game is not strategically equivalent to a zero-sum game via a PAT and the algorithm terminates. If γ > 0, the algorithm continues by calculating D and then lines 15 through 23 implement 15. We note here that determining if D = 0 m×n , if D has constant columns (repeated rows) or if D has constant rows (repeated columns) is trivial matrix subtraction, which has time O(mn). This shows that overall the algorithm has time O(mn).
Finally, we turn our attention to the SolveStratNE algorithm. The algorithm takes as input two game matrices (Ã,B) ∈ R m×n × R m×n and outputs a NE if possible. The algorithm simply calls SER0 in order to determine if the game has a guaranteed pure strategy NE or a strategically zero-sum NE. If the game is guaranteed to have a pure strategy NE, then that NE is calculated with a single call to a pure NE solver. Otherwise, if the game is strategically equivalent to a zero-sum game, the algorithm calculates the NE with a single call to an LP solver. Finally, if neither case is met the algorithm states this fact and sets the NE strategies to an invalid strategy profile.
